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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
Legislation declaring that proof of one fact shall be presumptive
of an ultimate fact to .be proved is deemed invalid unless there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and those which may
be inferred.' Thus, a Georgia statute2 placing upon a railroad com-
pany the burden of disproving a presumption of negligence 8 raised
upon mere proof of injury caused by the "running of locomotives or
cars" was held by the Supreme Court of the United States uncon-
stitutional because there was no rational connection between the fact
of injury and the negligence inferred therefrom. 4
This same court, in construing a statute creating a presumption
of knowledge of insolvency against bank officials upon proof of re-
ceiving deposits during insolvency, held that a rational connection be-
tween fact proved and fact inferred was unnecessary where the legis-
lature had the power to impose absolute liability upon proof of the
fact raising the presumption.5 Under this ruling, a preliminary test
as to the validity of a presumption would be whether a like rule,
imposing absolute liability, would be invalid. Applying this test to
the Georgia statute,6 the first question would be, whether the legis-
lature had the power to impQse absolute liability upon a railroad for
any injuries caused by the running of its locomotives or cars. That
absolute liability may be imposed under certain conditions is shown
by statutes making railroads absolutely liable for fire communicated
'Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 170, remd., 49 S. Ct. 215 (1928) ;
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498 (1916) ;
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191, 31 S. Ct. 145 (1911).
'Ga. Ann. Code (Michie, 1926) §280. "A railroad company shall be liable
for any damage done to persons, stock or other property by the running of
locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, unless the company
shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reason-
able care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company."
'The above statute, supra note 2, is' construed in the following cases,
Western and Atlantic R. R. v. Thompson, 38 Ga. App. $99, 144 S. E. 831(1928); Central of Georgia R. R. v. Barnett, 35 Ga. App. 528, 134 S. E. 126(1926); Ellenberg v. Southern R. R., 5 Ga. App. 389, 63 S. E. 240 (1908).
'Plaintiff's husband was killed when the truck he was driving collided with
the defendants' train at a crossing. The Georgia courts, in conitruing the
statute above, supra note 2, held that the defendant railroad company must
disprove .by a preponderance of evidence every particular in which it was al-
leged to have been negligent. Western and Atl. R. R. v. Henderson, 35 Ga.
App. 353, 133 S. E. 645 (1926), aff'd, 36"Ga. App. 679, 137 S. E. 855 (1927),
aff'd, 167 Ga. 22, 144 S. E. 905 (1928), rev'd, 49 S. Ct. 443, 73 L. Ed. 519
(1929), aff'd, 149 S. E. 101 (1929).
'Ferry v. Ramsay, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S. Ct. 443 (1923) ; cf. Manley v. State,
supra note 1, where a similar statute creating a presumption of criminal intent
was held unconstitutional. See (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 62, 453.
'Supra note 2.
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by its engines,7 for injuries to passengers," and for injuries'to third
persons caused by failure to maintain their crossings in safe condi-
tion.9 Whether a legislature has the power to go a step further in
imposing absolute liability upon a railroad seemingly resolves itself
into a question of policy. As contrasted with the foregoing statutes,
the Federal courts' 0 and those of a majority of the states"1 adopt a
policy more favorable toward railroads in imposing the duty to stop,
look, and listen upon persons approaching railroad tracks. This is
based upon the practical considerations that a person can avoid a
train more easily than a train can avoid him, and the expense and
inconvenience of stopping and starting trains. A frequent reason
for imposing absolute liability is that in the particular type of cases,
the class of persons so made liable is the one usually at fault. This
would not be true in the railroad accident cases because the person
injured is as often at fault as the railroad. On the other hand, it
may be argued that due to the danger inherent in operating trains, a
number of accidents occur unavoidably, and that still more occur
through the fault of both parties, and that even where only one party
is to blame, it is often impossible to prove that he is the one at fault.
It may be suggested that society should indirectly bear the burden
of these accidents by making the railroads pay for them in the first
instance,--a burden which the railroads can ultimately shift to the
public by means of their rates.' 2 It seems then fairly arguable that
absolute liability for train accidents might constitutionally be imposed
upon the railroads. The court, however, in the Georgia case, abso-
lutely ignored this phase of the question.
Conceding, however, that a legislature does not have the power
St. Louis and S. F. R. R. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 611, 17 S. Ct.
243 (1896) ; Anderson v. Minneapolis, etc. R. R. Co., 150 Minn. 530, 185 N.
W. 299 (1921). See 5 WIGmoIF, EViDENCE, (2d. Ed.) §2509, and notes 3 and 4.
'Chicago, etc. R. R. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N. W. 26 (1900), aff'd,
183 U. S. 592, 46 L. Ed. 339, 22 S. Ct. 229 (1902). See also (1899), 13 Hxv.
L. REv. 604.
" Talley v. Pittsburg, etc. R. R., 231 Ill. App. 513 (1923) ; Mouson v. Chi-
cago, etc. R. R., 181 Iowa 1354, 159 N. W. 679 (1916).
""When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a
place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of
the track. He knows that he must stop for the train and not the train stop for
him." Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 67, 48 S. Ct. 24
(1922).
' Lutz v. Davis, 195 Iowa 1049, 192 N. W. 15 (1923) ; Castle v. Director
General of the Railroads, 232 N. Y. 430, 134 N. E. 334 (1922) ; Costin v. Tide-
water Power Co., 181 N. C. 196, 106 S. E. 568 (1921).
' See Elsbree and Roberts (1928) Compulsory Inmrance against Motor
Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 690.
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to imp6se absolute liability upon railroad companies for all injuries
caused by the running of their trains, it does not necessarily follow
that a legislature should be denied the power to impose the lesser
handicap of a presumption. Thus, a presumption of negligence from
derailment has been held constitutional on the ground that there was
a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed
therefrom.13 But the Court, in holding the Georgia statute14 uncon-
stitutional because its "reasoning does not lead from the occurrence
back to its cause," overlooks the fact that presumptions without such
rational connection have been held constitutional upon the ground
that they were based upon some reason of policy distinct from the
mere probability of the inference. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
says, "Some rebuttable presumptions have no logical core but rest
upon some policy of that particular 'branch of substantive law with
which they are connected."' 5 For illustration, the presumption that
if goods are handled by several carriers, damage in transit was caused
by the last carrier, is obviously based upon the policy of relieving the
shipper of the initial burden of. investigation and putting it on some
one who has the facilities for doing it. Therefore, granting there is
no basis of probability for the presumption created by the Georgia
statute,16 it should not be held unconstitutional if it is based upon
some reasonable policy. That such a presumption would stimulate
railroads to disclose facts peculiarly within their own knowledge, the
non-disclosure of which would defeat the ends of justice; and, also
' Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. Ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136,
55 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 463 (1910). It has been settled by
the Supreme Court of the United States that a presumption must have a rational
connection between fact proved and fact presumed therefrom, supra note 1.
Thus, a statute raising a presumption of knowledge of actual possession of a
still upon mere proof of finding the still on defendant's land was held valid
because the "existence upon the land of distilling apparatus ...has a natural
relation to the fact that the occupant of the land has knowledge of ...its
existence." Hawes v. State, 258 U. S. 1, 42 S. Ct. 204 (1922). For further
illustration see, Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 729, 13 S. Ct. 1016(1892); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L.
ed. 569 (1926) ; Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 214, 37 S. Ct. 255 (1916) ;
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 588, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1903). Contra: 2 WIG-
MoRE, EvnmDcs (2d. ed.) §1354 at page 1672, "If the legislature can make a
rule of evidence at all, it cannot be controlled by a judicial standard of ration-
ality, anymore than its economic fallacies can-be invalidated by the judicial
conceptions of economic truth . . .the legislature is not obliged to obey either
the axioms of rational evidence or the axioms of economic science."
" Supra note 2.
"'Progress of the Law, Evidence (1921), 35 HAiv. L. REv. 302, 311; see
also, Bohen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof (1920), 68 U. PA. L. Rrv. 307, 317, 320.
" Supra note 2.
NOTES
that their great wealth and power would enable them to disprove
negligence more easily than an individual could prove it, are practical
arguments for such presumptions. It is submitted that it should be
within the exclusive power of the legislature to determine when pub-
lic interest makes necessary a shift in evidential procedure so long as
such change is not merely arbitrary or capricious. 17
The Court also found the Georgia statute' s unconstitutional be-
cause the presumption created by it placed upon the railroad not a
mere duty of proceeding but the burden of disproving every allega-
tion of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. This statute
was distinguished from a Mississippi statute' 9 held constitutional by
this same Court because the latter merely required that the railroad
company go forward with the evidence.20 So far as we have been
able to find, this is the first time the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever given the shifting of the risk of non-persuasion as a
ground for holding a statutory presumption invalid. On the other
hand, several statutes which shifted the risk of non-persuasion have
been held constitutional. 21
' 2 WiGmoRE- EVIDENCE (2d ed.), §1354 at page 1670, "There is not the
least doubt, on principle, that the legislature has entire control over such rules;
as it has over all other rules of procedure in general, and evidence in particular,
subject only to the limitations expressly enshrined in the Constitution." As to
the constitutional limitations upon rules of evidence, see 1 WiG OP, EVIDENCE(2d ed.), §7. The determination of the constitutionality of a rule of evidence
resolves itself into a balancing of "rights." "Choice must be exercised. The
choice is not, however, capricious, it involves judgment between defined claims,
each of recognized validity, each with a pedigree of its own, but all of which
cannot be satisfied completely." Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions of Jus-
tice Holmes (1915) 29 HAmv. L. RVv. 636, 686.
Supra note 2.
19 Miss. Ann. Code (Hemmingway, 1927), §1645. "... Proof of injury
inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of such company shall be
prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of
the servants of the company in reference to such injury." In Mobile etc. R. R.
v. Turnipseed, supra note 13, this statute was held to impose upon the defend-
ant railroad the duty of going forward with the evidence. It should be noted
that the plaintiff in the Georgia case was a third person killed in a crossing
collision, whereas the plaintiff in the Mississippi case was an employee injured
by a derailment.
"The indiscriminate use of the word "presumption" has caused confusion.
It may mean anything from just enough evidence to get to the jury to a con-
clusive presumption. McCormick, Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5
N. C. L. REv. 291, 307. That the Georgia statute does more than create a true
presumption because it is not the function of a presumption to shift the onus
of proof; see 4 WIGmoaE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), §2489. That a presumption may,
exceptionally shift the onus of proof, see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, supra note 15.
"Minneapolis M. R. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 48 L. ed. 614 (1903) ; Fong
Yue Ting v. U. S., supra note 13; Adams v. New York, supra note 13; Hawes
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The fundamental principle that the plaintiff must prove his case
has been modified both by legislative enactment and judicial decision
to meet the complexities of a changing civilization. Thus, there are
statutes which shift certain portions of the burden of proof from the
plaintiff, upon whom it originally rested, to the defendant. In some
instances, the mere duty of producing evidence has been shifted to
the defendant, in others, the risk of non-persuasion has been imposed,
and in still others, absolute liability has been placed upon the de-
fendant. Also, the courts, by invoking the doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitor," have achieved the same results obtained by legislative enact-
ments.22 Of course it would be logical that where a legislature could
impose absolute liability, it could also impose the lesser burdens of
the risk of non-persuasion and of producing evidence. Likewise, if
the legislature is empowered to shift the duty of proceeding with the
evidence in a particular situation to the defendant, there seems little
reason to deny it the power to impose the heavier burden of the risk
of non-persuasion upon the defendant in a similar situation, as the
effect of shifting the risk of non-persuasion is but to require the de-
fendant, in his defense, to prove a part of the case which was orig-
inally required of the plaintiff. Illustrations of this apportionment
can be found in every case of the so-called "affirmative defenses."
Thus, in defamation, the plaintiff alleges but need not prove the falsity
of the defendant's statements. The defendant must prove "truth."23
So, in an action on a note the plaintiff avers that it is unpaid, but the
defendant must plead and prove payment.2 4 There is no logic in
these apportionments, nor does experience indicate a probability that
notes are unpaid or grave imputations false. The real reason for
shifting this risk of non-persuasion is based upon beliefs as to the
expediency of requiring one party or the other to bear the risk of the
failure to disclose, convincingly, the pertinent facts about the partic-
ular issue.
v. Georgia, supra note 13; Hawkins v. Bleakley, supra note 13; James-Dickin-
son Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, supra note 13. It should be noted that the
Supreme Court of the United States in construing the statutes in the above
cases based their decisions upon the ground that there was probability in the
presumptions created.
'See excellent comment (1923) 12 CAL. L. REv. 138.
"Warner v. Fuller, 245 Mass. 520, 139 N. E. 811 (1923) ; Riley v. Stone,
174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
"Where the plaintiff produces in evidence the defendant's note, uncanceled,
upon which suit was brought, the burden is on the defendant to show that he
had paid it, in order to establish this as a defense. Citizens Bank v. Knox,
187 N. C. 565, 122 S. E. 304 (1924) ; Swan v. Carawan, 168 N. C. 473, 84 S. E.
706 (1915).
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It is probable that the Court will not adhere to its distinction be-
tween presumptions imposing the risk of non-persuasion and those
merely shifting the duty of proceeding with the evidence. If it con-
tinues to require that statutory presumptions be based upon a "ra-
tional connection," it will doubtless extend this same requirement to
statutes shifting the mere duty of going forward with the evidence.2 5
It is hoped, however, that it will do neither, but will adopt the more
liberal attitude of holding every type of statutory presumption valid
where absolute liability could be imposed in the same situation,2 6
and, where absolute liability could not be imposed, of holding a
statutory presumption valid if it is -based either upon a "probable
connection" or some authorized reason of policy.
2 7
J. FRAziER GLENN, JR.
RIsK OF Loss IN BANK COLLECTIONS UNDER NORTH CAROLINA
STATUTE
As an emergency measure, North Carolina, together with a num-
ber of other states, enacted a statute1 permitting a drawee bank to
" A statute making failure to perform labor contracted for without refund-
ing the money paid therefor prima facie evidence of criminal intent was de-
clared unconstitutional although it was construed as meaning just enough
evidence to go to the jury from which they could find for either party. Bailey
v. Alabama, supra note 1. This case seems to indicate the importance placed
upon a probable connection by the Supreme Court of the United States.
" This attitude was adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ferry v. Ramsay,
supra note 5.
' Since the completion of this note, and after the United States Supreme
Court's decision holding the Georgia statute unconstitutional, supra note 4, the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held this same statute constitutional on the ground
that the U. S. Supreme Court had erroneously construed the statute as shifting
the risk of non-persuasion when its proper construction, indicated by a long
line of decisions, merely required the railroad company to proceed with the
evidence. Ga. Ry. and Power Co. v. Shaw, 149 S. E. 657 (Ga., Oct. 1929). The
constitutionality of this decision will be the subject of a comment in a forth-
coming issue of this LAw REv.vW.
It should be noted that the Georgia legislature, immediately after and ap-
parently as a result of the decision in the Henderson case, supra note 4, passed
an act approved August 24, 1929, which creates a presumption of negligence
against a railroad company in the words of the Mississippi statute, held con-
stitutional in Mobile, etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, supra note 13.
'N. C. Code 1927, §220 (aa) as enacted by N. C. Pub. Laws 1921, Ch. 20,
§2. In order to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary amounts of money in
the vaults of the banks and trust companies chartered by this state, all checks
drawn on said banks and trust companies shall, unless specified on the face
thereof to the contrary by the maker or makers thereof, be payable in ex-
change drawn on the reserve deposits of said banks, when any such check is
presented by or through any Federal Reserve Bank, postoffice or express com-
pany or any respective agent thereof. Held constitutional in Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 43 S. Ct.
